激勵(lì)理論

ForewordIntroductionl Incentives in Economic Thought 1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture 1.2 Chester Barlmrd and Incentives in Management 1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Groves: Tile Free-Rider Problem 1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting 1.5 Leon Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies 1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Iurance 1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives 1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination 1.9 Incentives in Planned Economies 1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design 1.11 Auctio2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off 2.1 The Basic Model 2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract 2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts 2.4 Information Rents 2.5 The Optimization Program of the Principal 2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off 2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information 2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing 2.9 Tile Revelation Principle 2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent 2.11 Ex Ante veus Ex Post Participation Cotraints 2.12 Commitment 2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms, 2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting, 2.15 Contract Theory at Work Appendix3 Incentive and Participation Cotraints with Advee Selection 3.1 More than Two Types 3.2 Multidimeional Asymmetric Information 3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Cotraint and CountervailingIncentiTces 3.4 Random Participation Cotraint 3,5 Limited Liability 3,6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification 3.7 Redistributive Concer and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off Appendices4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs 4.1 Tile Model 4.2 Risk Neutrality and Fit-Best hnplementation 4.3 The Trade-Off Between Limited Liability Rent Extraction andEfficiency 4.4 Tile Trade-Off Between Iurance and Efficiency 4.5 More than Two Levels of Performance 4.6 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting 4.7 Moral Hazard and the Theory of the Finn 4.8 Contract Theory at Work 4.9 Commitment Under Moral Hazard. Appendices5 Incentive and Participation Cotraints with Moral Hazard. 5.1 More than Two Levels of Effort 5.2 The Multitask Incentive Problem 5.3 Noeparability of the Utility Function 5.4 Redistribution and Moral Hazard Appendices6 Nonverifiability 6.1 No Contract at Date 0 and Ex Post Bargaining 6.2 Incentive Compatible Contract 6.3 Nash Implementation 6.4 Subgame-Perfect Implementation 6.5 Risk Aveion 6.6 Concluding Remarks7 Mixed Models 7.1 Advee Selection Followed by Moral Hazard 7.2 Moral Hazard Followed by Advee Selection 7.3 Moral Hazard Followed by Nonverifiability8 Dynamics under Full Commitment 8.1 Repeated Advee Selection b.2 Repeated Moral Hazard 8.3 Cotraints on Trafe: The Role of hnplicit Incentives9 Limits and Exteio 9.1 Informed Principal. 9.2 Limits to Enforcement 9.3 Dynamics and Limited Commitment 9.4 The Hold-Up Problem 9.5 Limits to the Complexity of Contracts 9.6 Limits in the Action Space 9.7 Limits to Rational Behavior 9.8 Endogenous Information StructuresReferencesAuthor IndexSubject Index